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WIRE COMMUNICATIONS UTILITIES AND
BOOKMAKING
CHARLES B. HAGAN*

I.

T

INTRODUCTION

presence of an obligation of the utility to serve all comers
without discrimination and the absence of an obligation "to
furnish service to those who are reasonably sure to use it for illegal
purpose"1 creates a dilemma for the telephone and telegraph utilities. The route out of the dilemma is not without its difficulties insofar as clear cut rules are concerned. It is proposed to examine the
developments in recent years in connection with that puzzler. The
subject, perhaps it is needless to say, is of more than merely curious
interest both to the communications utilities and to bookmakers on
horse races. Law enforcing agencies also, as will be seen, have an
important role in the relations that might develop between the
bookmakers and the utilities.
The business is of more than abstract concern. A considerable
amount of activity has developed since 1938 on the horse racing
front. The American Municipal Association devoted some attention to interstate aspects of crime in general and bookmaking in
particular in its meeting in 1949. In February, 1950, the Department of Justice in Washington sponsored a conference of law enforcing officials from all levels, national, state and local.2 The
conference was concerned with many facets of law enforcement, but
one segment of the problem was to be found in the transmission of
racing news. Mayor Morrison of New Orleans remarked in the
course of the conference,
"The principal racing wire service in the country is the Continental Press Service, which is the key to the multi-milliondollar betting business. Its 16,000 miles of leased wire service
cover 300 key handbook areas. It is difficult to pin down the
annual take of this industry, but the best estimates put it at
double or treble the volume of pari-mutual betting at legalized
race tracks-or from $3,000,000,000 to $8,000,000,000 per
HE

year." 3
*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois.
1. People ex rel. Restmeyer v. New York Tel. Co., 173 App. Div. 132,
159 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1916). See also Tracy v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel.
Co., 37 F. Supp. 829 (S.D. Fla. 1940).
2. The proceedings of this conference are reprinted in Hearings before
a subcommittee of the Committee wt Interstate Commerce and Foreign Com-

merce on Sen. 3358, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-46 (1950).
3. Reprint of Mayor Morrison's speech, Cong. Rec. A1219 (Feb. 17,
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In the course of this speech Mayor Morrison recommended that the
Congress adopt legislation to outlaw dissemination of race results
across state lines by telephone, telegraph or radio for illegal
gambling purposes.
The Senate of the United States responded to the pressures
thus manifested in two ways. Senator Kefauver (Tennessee) introduced in January a resolution calling for a general inquiry into
gambling and racketeering activities. The Attorney General requested Senator Johnson (Colorado) to introduce legislation following the above conference. These bills called for the prohibition
of transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of gambling
devices and the transmission in interstate and foreign commerce of
gambling information by communications facilities. Kefauver's
resolution resulted in the creation of a special committee which is
currently carrying on its investigation. The other bills were referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
4
which held hearings.
It is proposed here to examine the historical background of the
utility's obligation in this area of activity and also to formulate the
existing controls that have been developed. Two distinctly different
recent situations may be preliminarily outlined. First, there is the
local use of the telephone instruments for the placing of bets and
for the gaining of information concerning race results immediately
after the same have been run. Secondly, there is the firm that
undertakes to furnish information concerning various sporting
events but with particular attention to horse racing. In the latter
case the firm usually publishes a paper or 'scratch sheet' and announces therein that it will answer telephone calls on race results
as the firm receives them. A more detailed description of the activi1950). In the course of the speech the Mayor connected the Continental Press

Service with the Capone Syndicate and bookmaking. The latter charges were
denied by the Service. N. Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1950, p. 2. In PUC v. Bell Tel.
Co. of Penn., 25 P. U. R. (n.s.) 452, 456 (1938) : "It has been estimated
that more than $5,000,000 is wagered daily in the pool rooms of the 39
states receiving the gambling service.... ." The Mayor described the situation
in and near New Orleans in these words: "The Continental News Service
...does not come into New Orleans. Its leased Western Union wires do
service just above and below our city. Through batteries of telephone relays
they service handbooks below and above our city limits. Despite the continuing enforcement efforts of our police there are still sporadic bookie
operations in our city. But the lack of direct phone service and our insistence
that the telephone company pull out telephones of all raided establishments
has held these operations down to a minimum .... "
4. Kefauver's Resolution started out as Sen. Res. 202. The other bills
carry numbers Sen. 3357, 3358. The Hearings have been printed, Transmission of Gambling Information; Hearings, supra note 2.
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ties of such a firm will be given later when its 'legal standing is
examined.
The current developments grow out of an historical background which provides contemporary courts with two lines of
approach to a solution of the dilemma. The earliest case that has
been found to deal with the use by gamblers of common carrier's
communications equipment arose in Kentucky in the eighties and
was decided by that state's supreme court in 1887. One Smith
sought to compel Western Union to furnish telegraph service.
Western Union then was contracting with its customers to become their exclusive means of telegraphic communication. The
Company offered to serve on that condition which was refused and
the suit to compel service resulted. Smith operated a 'bucket shop'
and under the customary operations of such a shop he wagered
with his customers on the rise or fall of the prices which would be
furnished over the circuits of Western Union. The Supreme Court
upheld the Company's refusal to serve and asserted that there was
no obligation of a utility to furnish its facilities for illegal uses.5
The courts of the same state furnish the premises for a syllogism leading to the opposite conclusion. Some fourteen years after
the above decision the Court of Appeals reviewed a case arising
out of a demurrer to an indictment. Western Union furnished wires
to a gambling house in Louisville in which gambling was facilitated
by the data provided by the telegraph service. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's holding that the demurrer was an
adequate defense, saying in part,
".... Common carriers are not the censors of public or private
morals. ... It was certainly no wrong per se for the appellee

to transmit over its line the information which it is charged to
have transmitted. The simple fact that persons who received the
information, and as a result of it, were guilty of unlawful acts,
does not make the appellee a violator of the penal or criminal
law. If in doing so it violated the penal or criminal law, it would
be likewise guilty in transmitting information to the newspapers
of the country as to prospective prize fights and horse races,
because the information thus published induced persons to
engage in betting on their results ... "
5. Smith v. Western Union Tel. Co., 84 Ky. 664, 2 S. W. 483 (1887)
(the bucket shop method of operation is described).
6. Commonwealth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 112 Ky. 355, 67 S. W. 59
(1901). Minnesota courts had a similar view dating from 1888. State v.
Shaw, 39 Minn. 153, 39 N. W. 305 (1888). The issues were not exactly the
same. The question involved the meaning of the word "devices" in the antigambling law, and the Court said "A horse race is not a gambling device, nor
are the descriptive lists of such races, or statements or announcements of
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Contemporary court rulings to substantially the same effect may be
found. In the Supreme Court of Florida in 1938 a sheriff was enjoined from seizing telephone equipment which was utilized to
gain information which was in turn sold to bookies for use in their
gambling activity. The Court thought that the service furnished
was not a crime, but that the use made of the information gained
was the crime. The conclusion was therefore clear: the sheriff
ought to secure indictments against the real criminals, i.e., the
bookies.

7

The most emphatic statement of the rule of law in accord with
this conclusion is to be found in People v.Brophy, where it is said,
".. . The telephone company has no more right to refuse its

facilities to persons because of a belief that such persons will
use such service to transmit information that may enable recipients thereof to violate the law than a railroad compan)
the particulars thereof, from which those desiring to bet on the races may

more conveniently obtain information in respect to the same and we are unable to see that the boards and lists or records of the pools sold described in
the indictment are anything more. There is no element of chance in their
use, which we think is the test. The defendant's methods undoubtedly serve
to facilitate gambling, and so does the fact that they keep open a place for
gambling, and the same may be said also of the published schedules of races
and games, and many other acts and things, which, however, cannot be
denominated 'gambling devices' within the meaning of the statute. . .

."

For

a similar ruling see People v. Engeman, 129 App. Div. 463, 114 N. Y. Supp.
174 (1908). Other authorities to the same effect are cited in the Kentucky
case supra; Ives v. Boyce, 85 Neb. 324, 123 N. W. 318 (1909) (held the telegraph wire, the blackboard and ticker located in a bucket shop not to be a
gambling device).
A more recent ruling to the same effect is to be found in In re Teletype
Machine No. 33335, 126 Pa. Super. 533, 191 Atl. 210 (1937) (sub min. In re
American Tel. and Tel. Co.). Here a decision forfeiting the teletype machine
was reversed even though the operator of the place where the machine was

found pleaded nolo contendere to gambling charges. The court stated ".
it (the teletype machine) is, in no sense, an article, device, or apparatus to
win or gain money, or at which money or other valuable things may be
played for a stake or betted upon. It is a machine or apparatus for transmitting or conveying information, not a gambling device or apparatus ....
The fact that gamblers may use the information thus received in their unlawful business, for the purpose of making bets or wagers or to pay off,
does not turn the teletype into a gambling machine .... If the legislature sees
fit to enact that a machine or instrument knowingly used to furnish or obtain
information to be used in gambling may be seized, forfeited, and condemned
along with actual devices so used, etc. it may perhaps do so under the police
power, but such authority cannot be inferred from an act merely authorizing
the seizure and destruction of gambling devices and apparatus... "
7. Hagerty v. Coleman, 133 Fla. 363, 182 So. 776 (1938). As will be
related below Hagerty's troubles were not at an end. See also State v.
Coleman, 126 Fla. 203, 170 So. 722 (1936) (court relied heavily on the
above case) ; People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 120 P. 2d 946 (1942)
(statements to the same effect, it will be discussed below). See cases cited in
the Brophy Case, supra especially People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P. 2d 472
(1941). The same rule appears to be operative in Canada, see Telephony,
Dec. 5, 1942, p. 27; Id., Dec. 19, 1942, p. 26. It is there related that the Bell
Telephone Company of Canada was ordered to restore service to a bookie.
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would have to refuse to carry persons on its trains because
those in charge of the train believed that the purpose of the
persons so transported in going to a certain point was to
commit an offense, or because the officers of such company
were aware of the fact that the passengers were intent upon
visiting a bookmaking establishment upon arrival at their destination, which establishment was maintained for the purpose of
unlawfully receiving bets on horse races. Furthermore, the
furnishing or receiving of racing or sporting information is not
gambling and is not a crime...."I'
The clearest formulation of a major premise by which an opposite answer can be drawn from the circumstances is provided in
Plotnick v. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania. The Public
Utilities Commission of Pennsylvania said,
"...

To get an intelligent idea as to whether or not two tele-

phones which complainant proposes to install at 311 Ludlow
building, Philadelphia, and additional telephones as the business
develops, may be used in the furtherance of an illegal purpose,
one must not isolate the parts that make up the whole of the
operation. The race track, the horse races, the publication and
distribution of a 'scratch sheet,' the telephone used for obtaining information before making bets and before paying off
winners, the bookie that buys the 'scratch sheet' and uses it in
carrying on his gambling business, and the betting that results
from the publication and distribution and telephone information
received from the complainant, must be looked at collectively.
as a plan and scheme as a whole, aiding and abetting the furtherance of gambling on horse races in this commonwealth." '
The Commission moreover refused to order the Company to furnish telephone service even though such service was being furnished simultaneously to another customer. The Commission
pointed out that the illegal conduct ought to stop and the proper
result would be for the Company to discontinue service to the
other customer. The Commission was unsuccessful in its efforts
to accomplish that result.' 0
8. People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 27, 120 P. 2d 946, 956 (1942).
The proceedings grew out of events arising out of the efforts by the state of
California and the national government to discontinue the Nationwide News
Service. See below for a more complete account. The opinion in the instant
case affords the most elaborate discussion of the legal issues in support of
that position. Accord, Kreling v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 18
Cal. 2d 884, 118 P. 2d 470 (1941) ; Penn. Publications Inc. v. PUC, 349
Pa. 184, 36 A. 2d 777 (1944) (same case below 25 P. U. R. (n.s.) 452
(1938), 42 P. U. R. (n.s.) 170 (1942), 43 P. U. R. (n.s.) 26 (1942), 152
Pa. Super. 279, 32 A. 2d 40 (1943)).
9. Plotnick v. Bell Tel. Co. of Penn., 35 P. U. R. (n.s.) 87, 93 (1940),
aff'd, 143 Pa. Super. 550, 18 A. 2d 542 (1941).
10. Penn. Publications Inc. v. PUC, 349 Pa. 184, 36 A. 2d 777 (1944).
A more complete record of the proceeding is given in footnote 7 supra. The
facts are not without their ironical aspects. Plotnick had originally published
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The ambiguous situation which thus may be said to exist in
Pennsylvania does not prevail in some other jurisdictions. Oklahoma in 1911 had a ruling that the furnishing of communications
services to a Turf Exchange where wagers were accepted converted the 'wire services into gambling devices which were then
illegal. 1
A more elaborate statement of the rule in those jurisdictions
may be shown in the following quotation from the District of
Columbia court.
"A public utility, such as a common carrier, a telegraph company, or a telephone company, must serve all members of the
public without discrimination or distinction. In this respect,
public utilities are different from other businesses, such as
stores, restaurants, and theaters, which may select their customers. That fact that a person may be of bad character does
not deprive him of the right to receive service from a public
utility. On the other hand, the facilities of a public utility may
not be used for criminal purposes. A public utility has not only
a right but a duty to refuse to render service for criminal purposes. For example, a railroad company may not refuse to carry
a passenger merely because he has a criminal record or is engaged in an illegal or immoral business. If, however, the transportation is sought for the very purpose of committing and
consummating an illegal act, transportation may and should be
refused. Thus, if a person intending to commit a robbery at a
distant point gets on a train for the purpose of reaching that
place, and information of this fact is in possession of the railroad company, the passenger may be put off the train. On the
other hand, he may not be put off the train merely because he
is an immoral person or is engaged generally in illegal activities.
It clearly follows, therefore, that a telephone company may
refuse to furnish or may discontinue service that has been
furnished if the service is used for a criminal purpose, such
as violation of the gambling statutes. The burden of proof,
however, is on the public utility to establish the fact that the
service is being used or is about to be used for a criminal purpose. Naturally, since this is a civil matter, such fact need not
if it is
be established beyond a reasonable doubt. It is sufficient
1 2
shown by a fair preponderance of the evidence."'
such a sheet in Philadelphia. He accepted employment with Penn. Publications and remained with them for several years. He decided to reenter the
business for himself. He had no sheets to show the Commission in his
original proceeding for service and displayed Penn. Publications materials as
illustrative of the service that he planned to provide.
11. James v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. 603, 112 Pac. 944 (1911).
12. Andrews v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 83 F. Supp. 966 (D.
D.C. 1949) ; Katz v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 80 P. U. R. (n.s.) 76
(D.C. 1949). In Hearings, supra note 2, at 888 et seq. there is reprinted a
Staff Report to the Federal Communications Commission on certain aspects
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With a choice available to the states as to which of the two
main principles each shall use in making or not making a connection between the communications utility and the illicit bookmaker,
attention will be directed first to local service and the local bookmaker and secondly to the wider and somewhat more intransigent
problem of the racing news service which does not engage in bookmaking but which certainly simplifies the operating problems of the
bookmaker in his daily routine. The news service furnishes an
important if not indispensable service, and its legal status is not
without some importance.
Some states have enacted statutes prohibiting the public utilities from furnishing its facilities for the purpose of disseminating
gambling information.1"
IH.
In the State of New York it has been said by its courts, "It
certainly is not an unlawful or oppressive use of police power to
interrupt telephone service by arrangement between the police
and the telephone company where the telephone is being used, as
it was in this case, to carry on a criminal business.' '14 The practice

of the telephone company and the various police departments to
have working arrangements has continued. The usual routine so
far as it may be discerned in the reported proceedings operates
about as follows. The police, perhaps by tapping a phone, 15 discover what they consider to be bookmaking or acceptance of bets.
The company is notified by letter or other communication and requested to remove the phone. The Company removes the phone,
and usually will not restore service unless restoration is approved
in advance by the police department or alternatively there is a
court order. Where the Company refuses to restore service, the
of the use of communications facilities for transmission of racing data. It is
there stated "Bookmaking or the practice of accepting wagers on horse
races is unlawful in 47 of the 48 states and in the District of Columbia ..
Nevada is the exception.
13. Florida in 1949 passed an act which has been sustained in the
Supreme Court of the State, McInerney v. Ervin, 46 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1950).
A copy of the opinion is reprinted in the Hearings, supra note 2, at 584-88.
Nevada has a similar law, Hearings, supra note 2, at 826-27. It was also
adopted in 1949. An earlier Michigan statute prohibits publication of information about betting odds and related matters. It was upheld on publication of such data prior to the event. Parkes v. Bartlett, 236 Mich. 460, 210
N. W. 492 (1926).
14. People v. New York Tel. Co., 173 App. Div. 132, 159 N. Y. Supp.
369 (1916). See also People v. New York Tel. Co., 119 Misc. 61, 195 N. Y.
Supp. 332 (1922).
15. Di Benedetto v. New York Tel. Co., 83 N. Y. S. 2d 920 (1948);
Cyprus v. New York Tel. Co., 192 Misc. 671, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 114 (1948).
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applicant for service may apply to the courts for such an order.' 6
An arrest seemingly coincides with such a request to the Company.
A similar set of working arrangements exists in other jurisdictions,
although the remedy of the person seeking restoration of phone
service may be in the agency regulating the utilities rather than
7

in the courts.1

The relationship between the utility and the customer in these
circumstances is not so simple. The police department becomes a
silent partner to the arrangement. However the latter is not an
indispensable party of record in a suit to restore service. The New
York Lourt of Appeals in a per curiam opinion asserts the following rule
"Whether or not service should be terminated or discontinued
is a decision that must be made by the telephone company.
That power as well -as duty rests with the public utility, and it
may not delegate the one or avoid the other. True, the company is free to consult with the'police department or with any
other law enforcement agency, and may be guided in its action
by the advice received. But whether the action is justified or
warranted must be determined by the telephone company upon
the facts presented. That being so, the telephone company is
the only indispensable, necessary or proper party in a proceeding sucn as that betore us."' That ruling would therefore qualify the opinion given three years
16. In re Manfredonio, 268 App. Div. 1073, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 393 (1944).
17. Massachusetts, Missouri, District of Columbit, Florida, New Jersey, Louisiana and Ohio have about the same process. In Giordullo v.
Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co., 71 N. E. 2d 858 (Ohio Common Pleas
194o) the procedure in Cincinnati is put in the following words by Justice
Struble, "it is a matter of common knowledge that the city police are
engaged in yanking telephones from walls and breaking up telephone equipment when and if the same in their judgment is being used for bookmaking
purposes. Counsel for the demurrer argues that such actions by the police
constitute police government. . . . The court agrees with counsel for the
demurrer that his client was the victim of police government .... The telephone company required the plaintiff to get the ok. of the chief of police
before it would give plaintiff telephone service and withdrew the same upon
the request of the chief of police, all without any hearing as to the gambling
charges-that is police government pure and simple. The court agrees with
counsel, too, that such a hook-up between the telephone company and the
chief of police is in utter disregard of the fundamental rights of the citizenry
of this city; but the court must disregard the alleged hook-up in passing
upon plaintiff's demurrer except to say that the telephone company cannot
excuse its actions in withdrawing plaintiff's telephone service on the claim
that it did so upon the request of the chief of police." See also Cologiavanni
v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 65 P. U. R. (n.s.) 171, 174 (1946) ("In
this instance the telephone company did not remove the telephone, which
removal was, in fact, made by the police officers. . . .") ; Hagerty v. Coleman, 133 Fla. 363, 182 So. 776 (1938) (the sheriff seized some equipment).
18. Shillitani v. Valentine, 296 N. Y. 161, 71 N. E. 2d 450 (1947);
accord, Andrews v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 83 F. Supp. 966 (D.
D.C. 1949).
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earlier in Dente v. New York Telephone Co. where the court asserted
"I hold that the telephone company was within its rights in
discontinuing service upon the request of the Police Department without an independent investigation of its own. The
Police Department refuses to rescind its request, and the respondent declines to restore the service without such rescission
or by order of the court. In this stand, likewise the Court holds
that the telephone company was within its rights. . .. "I"
In a series of cases the New York courts have ordered restoration of service where the petitioner for service had been arrested
for bookmaking and subsquently acquitted of those charges. 20 The
same result was reached where the charges were dismissed although
the police refused to approve the restoration of service. 21 Restoration was ordered where an employee of the telephone Company's
customer had used his employer's phone to take bets, seemingly
contrary to the latter's wishes. The employee had been discharged
and convicted.2 2 Likewise service was ordered restored where the
court and the police disagreed over the interpretation of a letter
in which the petitioner admitted using his phone to place bets. The
court construed the letter to be an admission of an individual who
occasionally placed a bet which was an entirely legal act. The petitioner in this case had been acquitted after his arrest. Relying on
the above cited Restmeyer Case the court added, "It is thus evident that the respondent may deny telephone service to a customer
only when it is reasonably sure that it will be used for an illegal
purpose in the future. It has no authority to deny telephone service
as a punishment for past crimes. Presumably the criminal courts
inflict punishment commensurate with the crime, and no other
19. Dente v. New York Tel. Co., 55 N. Y. S. 2d 688 (1944). In this
proceeding the court ordered the request for restoration of service to a
hearing to determine the answer to the question as to whether the phone was
being illegally used. It was further observed that the police order ought not
to last forever. Other similar cases are cited in this opinion.
20. Feldman v. Wallander, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 395 (1946) ; M. S. Tavern
Inc. v. New York Tel. Co., 82 N. Y. S. 2d 515 (1948).
21. Salter v. New York Tel. Co., 67 N. Y. S. 2d 396 (1946).
22. Knapp v. New York Tel. Co., 83 N. Y. S. 2d 919 (1948). In a somewhat similar factual situation the court ordered service restored. An employee had been arrested for bookmaking and he had not yet been tried.
The police had asked and the telephone co. had, in response thereto, discontinued service to the employer. The court somewhat curtly said "The undisputed facts establish that petitioner was not using or permitting his telephone to be used for unlawful acts in violation of the Penal Law. No act on
the part of petitioner has been assailed, and continuous uninterrupted service
for 40 years should not be terminated because of an isolated, unauthorized
act of an employee.
Whyte v. New York Tel. Co., 73 N. Y. S. 2d 138
(1947).
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punishment should be meted out by private organizations. '23
The effect of an acquittal on charges of bookmaking via the
telephone on the petition for restoration of service is not always
automatic. The telephone company has argued in instances where
it has refused to restore service on the police request even though
there has been an acquittal: that the acquittal creates no presumption of innocence of the facts charged and merely shows that the
guilt was not established beyond a reasonable doubt; that the
acquittal does not show that a fair preponderance of the evidence
did not point to guilt and that the latter is all that is needed to
justify the company in refusal of service. The court's comment on
this ingenuous line of reasoning was
"It is true that petitioner's acquittal creates no presumption in
his favor; conversely it creates no presumption against him.
Had he been convicted, his conviction would have been prima
facie evidence, in this proceeding, of his guilt. His acquittal,
while not prima facie evidence of his innocence, at least dispels the presumption against him.
. . . The petitioner is presumptively entitled, like any other
person, to equal telephone service. To deprive him of his right,
respondent must go forward and show by at least fair preponderance of the evidence that petitioner has
24 forfeited such
right. This the respondent has failed to do."
The courts will not order the restoration of service where they
are persuaded that the petitioner has used the facilities for illegal
bookmaking. It is conceded that it is not illegal to furnish racing
news by the telephone any more than it is illegal to furnish such
news by other means such as the radio, television, teletype or in
newspapers, 2' but if the proceedings show that the facilities have
been used knowingly to furnish information of the above character
to bookmakers, such activity constitutes enough to justify refusal
of service.
In Massachusetts the practices differ. Petitions for restoration of telephone service are filed with the Department of Public
Utilities. The Department has stated in such proceedings
"The telephone company was justified in discontinuing the
service of the petitioner at the request of the police commissioner on the ground stated by the police commissioner, that
23. Cyprus v. New York Tel. Co., 192 Misc. 671, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 114
(1948).
24. Di Benedetto v. New York Tel. Co., 83 N. Y. S. 2d 920 (1948). See
also Cologiavanni v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 65 P. U. R. (n.s.)
171 (1946) (it is stated ".... acquittal in a criminal court may not, of itself,
suffice as a reason for restoration of service ... "
25. Annette v. New York Tel. Co., 74 N. Y. S. 2d 331 (1947). See also
Shillitani v. Valentine, 296 N. Y. 161, 71 N. E. 2d 450 (1947).
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the police knew that the telephone was being used for gaming
purposes. The police commissioner of Boston is a public officer
charged with a vital responsibility for maintaining law and
order and prevention of crime in the city of Boston. As the
responsible head of the police department, his official acts are
entitled to the greatest respect.
Where no law has been violated and no statute has made good
faith essential to valid action, acts of administrative officers
cannot be attacked in judicial proceedings on the ground that
in fact those officers were not governed by the highest standards
'26
of impartial and unselfish performance of public duty.
In a similar proceeding in 1949 the Department refused to order
restoration of service where the petitioner had been convicted of
taking bets by phone on horse races. The petitioner urged that the
police ban on restoration should not continue indefinitely. The
record showed convictions for similar offense in 1939 and 1945.
The Department then stated, "The first requisite to the restoration
of telephone service incumbent on the petitioner is to satisfy the
27
police commissioner that he has in fact mended his ways.1

The Department has observed in refusing to grant an order for
restoration of service where it had been discontinued on request
of the police and after conviction for bookmaking
"This Department possesses no jurisdiction over the acts of
the chief of police of the city of Pittsfield in the performance
of his duty nor has the right to review his actions. Our jurisdiction applies only to the telephone company. If a person is
aggrieved by the official acts of the chief of police such person
may seek relief in the courts rather than from this Department.
Unless and until the courts shall decide that the action of the
chief of police in requesting the telephone company to discontinue the service to the petitioner unwarranted and baseless,
we feel bound to consider that a request such as was made to
the telephone company in this case is a necessary incident in the
prevention of crime and the maintenance of law and order
equally binding upon this Department as upon the telephone
company and as controlling in determining that the telephone
company has acted justly and reasonably in refusing
to furnish
2
telephone service after receiving such a request.
The cases in Massachusetts are presented to the regulatory
26. Carrozza v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 61 P. U. R. (n.s.) 249
(1942). See also A. C. Co. v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 79 P. U. R.
(n.s.) 159 (1949).
27. Rodman v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 61 P. U. R. (n.s.) 242
(1945). In this and the preceding case the petitioner was compelled to show
that the company's action was unjust and unreasonable whereas the Department takes the position that it is just and reasonable for the company to
refuse service when requested by the police commissioner.
28. McCabe v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 78 P. U. R. (n.s.) 127
(1949).
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authority in a slightly different context than the New York cases.
The Department considered whether the company's action in discontinuing service was in agreement with the company's rules.
The rules were considered reasonable and compliance therewith
was required by that Department. The situation is perhaps stated
in historical perspective more clearly in the following Connecticut
case. The Southern New England Telephone Company had re-.
fused to restore service on the advice of the State's Attorney for
Hartford County even though the party seeking restoration had
been acquitted of the charges of illegal use of the phone. The Commission ordered service restored. The Commission described the
circumstances out of which the Company regulations arose in the
following way.
"The Southern New England Telephone Company has in force
a rule respecting the circumstances under which it will refuse
or discontinue service where the telephone is used for the dissemination of racing news and bookmakers (sic). This rule is
embodied in the company's General Bulletin 46, dated February 26, 1945, and is the sequel of a policy of cooperation which
the telephone industry throughout the country has generally
adopted at the request of the Federal Communications Commission. With respect to preventing the use of telephones for
dissemination of racing information, rule 10 of the General
Bulletin provides that upon receipt by the company of notice
from a law enforcement officer, having jurisdiction, that certain designated service is being used for bookmaking, or aiding and abetting bookmaking, with a request for discontinuance of such service, the company will29 discontinue the service
upon notice thereof to the subscriber.

Such rules do not, of course, supercede the statutory duties of
the Commission, or the rights of the person seeking service. A
Federal district judge in commenting on this situation has said,
"True, there is a provision in the tariff of the telephone company to the effect that telephone service may be discontinued
and need not be furnished 'if any law enforcement agency,
acting within its jurisdiction, advises that such service is being
used or will be used in violation of law . . .' Obviously, if this

provision of the tariff is to be literally construed, it is not valid.
29. Cologiavanni v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 67 P. U. R.
(n.s.) 171, 174 (1946). The Commission discussed the rules of evidence

which it should follow and concluded, "While the entire testimony in the proceeding before the Commission awakens suspicion regarding the petitioner's
use of telephone service, such testimony nevertheless falls short of proving
that he has been using telephone service for unlawful purposes. The benefit
of any doubt in the matter should be given to the subscriber since the deprivation of telephone service is of serious consequence to any person, whether
for a business or residential use, under present-day reliance upon the telephone as a necessary and rapid means of communication. .... "
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A public utility may not deprive a member of the public of its
rights to service merely because it receives a notice from a law
enforcement agency that he is using the service for illegal
purposes. A public utility may refuse, and, in fact, must refuse,
service if to its knowledge the service is being used for illegal
purposes. This fact, however, must be established. To confer
what would amount to judicial power on a law enforcement
officer and to exercise such power ex parte would be violative
of due process of law and would deprive members of the public of their legal rights. A public utility may not do this, and
neither may a regulatory administrative body."' 30
The judge in that opinion required that illegal use appear by a
preponderance of the evidence. The New Jersey utility agency has
phrased the matter in approximately the same way. Ganek had been
arrested and pleaded guilty to charges of possessing racing slips.
The telephone service was discontinued and restoration was refused by the company when the police officer refused to sanction
it. Ganek then filed his petition to secure a commission order for
reinstallation of service. The commission denied the petition and
at the same time denied Ganek's claim that the Company must
show actual illegal use of the telephone to justify its refusal. Instead the Commission found the question to be the reasonableness
of the company's rules and the reasonableness of the application in
the circumstances. There was no "duty to show actual use of the
telephone for the improper purpose before discontinuing the same.
The Board holds that if respondent had reasonable cause for believing that its facilities were being used or will be used in furtherance of such illegal purposes, the respondent was justified in invoking its regulations and thus not assume the danger of rendering itself liable to statutory penalties of either a civil or criminal
nature."'"
The New Jersey Board in subsequent proceedings to install
service where it had been removed for illegal use seems to have
taken recourse to the view that the acts of public officials must be
given full effect. To the argument that the police might act unjustifiably at times the Board has answered that such questions
should be taken to the courts. The Board concluded that the company is justified in removing telephone service on police request
30. Andrews v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 83 F. Supp. 966 (D.
D.C. 1949).
31. Ganek v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 57 P. U. R. (n.s.) 146, 149
(1944). The police captain's refusal to approve restoration was considered

to be in support of the company's independent decision. See also the comments

of the Vice Chancellor in 1940 denying an injunction against New Jersey
Bell in another proceeding. The comment is printed in part in Plotnick v.
Bell Tel. Co. of Penn., 35 P. U. R. (n.s.) 87, 92 (1940).
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because of the dilemma presented by its own duties on the one side
32
and the authority attaching to the police request on the other.
Despite the above described rulings in the courts of California,
the Railroad Commission of that state in 1948 made a ruling which
may be summarized: It is in the public interest to prohibit communications utilities from furnishing or continuing to furnish telephone or telegraph service that will be or is being used illegally
in connection with bookmaking of race track bets while the latter
is illegal under California law. Such utilities have a "positive duty"
to exercise vigilance to prevent the unlawful use of its instrumentalities and facilities. 33
The more typical regulation that is now to be found in the
rules of the regulatory agencies or in the filed tariffs of the utility
may be indicated by the following excerpt from the Michigan Bell's
regulations,
".. . Whenever the judge of any court of record in Michigan
having jurisdiction over criminal offenses. . . . the attorney

general of Michigan, or the United States Attorney in and for
any Federal judicial district in Michigan, shall represent in
writing to the telephone company that he has probable cause
to believe that the service furnished at a designated location
is being used in furtherance of the commission of a specified
criminal offense and in such writing shall request that such
service be discontinued or terminated, the company, if not
restrained by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, will so
discontinue or terminate such service, with like effect as to
both the company and the customer as though the latter had of

-14
his own volition directed that the same be done. ...
32. Slapkowski v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 67 P. U. R. (n.s.) 33
(1947). See also De Luisa v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 78 P. U. R. (n.s.)
22 (1949). In Berenato v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 76 P. U. R. (n:s.) 1
(1948), Berenato had two phones in adjoining locations, one of which was
a restaurant which had a phone in the kitchen. Berenato was convicted of
having gambling paraphernalia in the place adjoining the restaurant. The
Department without police objection ordered the phone restored in the
restaurant providing it was in full view of customers. The other phone was
not restored.
33. Re Communications Utilities, 77 P. U. R. (n.s.) 581 (1948). See
also Millstone v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 82 P, U. R. (n.s.) 522 (1949).
34. Re Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 34 P. U. R. (n.s.) 65, 67 (1940). Attention may be called to the statement in the Staff Report to the FCC, Hearings,
stepra note 2, at 909: "All the Bell system associated companies have advised
the Commission that as a policy matter, they will refuse to install service
for a person engaged in bookmaking or, having installed service, will discontinue it upon learning of the illegal nature of the subscriber's business.
However, only eight companies appear to have instituted routines in
effectuation of their stated policies. . .

."

It is not clear whether the state-

ment still stands or whether it is true only of the situation in 1943, the date
of the report. The Senate Committee Report states: "Thus the communications common carriers are the instrumentalities through which racing in-
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II.
The contemporary developments in the regulation of the furnishing of news about horse-racing seem to have had their inception
in an investigation initiated by the Pennsylvania commission. The
immediate precipitating incidents may have been in connection
with an intrastate political party struggle, but its impact has far
transcended that immediate issue. 33 The Commission traced briefly
the background of the development of Nationwide News Service
and its subsidiaries. In 1927 A. T. and T. Co. began to furnish
leased wire service to Nationwide from race tracks to other points
in the U. S. Beginning with thirteen subscribers in 1927 Nationwide developed by 1935 to the point at which it had leased wire
connections with twenty-nine tracks with direct service to 223
cities in thirty-nine states and three Canadian provinces. The local
Bell companies then leased circuits to the local pool rooms or other
betting places within the cities. The Commission pointed out also
that A. T. and T. eliminated the intrastate, i.e. Pennsylvania,
service terminals after its investigation had gotten underway so
that the terminals were located outside the state of Pennsylvania.
The information then reached its local destinations via an interstate route and therefore was outside the state control. The Commission had some doubt of its authority to reach the "real root of
the offending," but it nonetheless ordered the Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania to cease rendering any service to any establishment which has any connection, telegraph or telephone, with
the race track circuit of Nationwide News Service or any of its
subsidiaries. The basis of the order was the general rule outlined
3
earlier that the utility has no duty to serve for an illegal end. 6
formation is widely disseminated, and they have important economic interests
in maintaining that business. A. T. & T. has testified on numerous occasions
that it is not interested in this business; that it does not want it. What they
refer to, of course, is the transmission of racing information to bookmakers
for illegal purposes, and there can be little question that the A. T. & T. itself
does not solicit that kind of business. The evidence, however, also discloses
no serious affirmative efforts by the telephone companies to divorce themselves from this business, either on a local or interstate basis. As to Western
Union, that company makes no secret of the fact that so long as it remains
a legal business, they intend to supply the facilities to carry it out." Sen.
Rep. No. 1752, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1950).
35. See Wire and Wireless Commwouication, 22 P. U. Fort. 701 (1938)
Telephony, Oct. 29, 1938, p. 30-31. It is suggested that the investigation
grew out of a Democratic clean-up campaign against the Republican leadership of M. L. Annenberg. The bearings of some aspects will be shown in the
developments in connection with Nationwide News Service.
36. PUC v. Bell Tel. Co. of Penn., 25 P. U. R. (n.s.) 452 (1938).
It is pointed out in FCC, Proposed Report Telephone Investigation, 419
(Govt. Ptg. Office 1938) that the Bell System derived an income of a million
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The more or less typical situation that exists in the furnishing of
racing information is described in the preceding paragraph. The
racing news company has wire service, telephone or telegraph, from
a race track and that service is sold to outlets in various cities
throughout the country. The local purchaser in turn sells the news
to his customers in his area. These customers may be newspapers,
radio news casts, or private parties. On occasion the local purchaser has a large number of telephone lines over which he will
answer questions as to particular races or over which he relays the
news of the race vocally to the customers. In some of the cases the
service at each end is denominated 'drops,' i.e., the leased wire at
each end is dropped on the premises of the customer.37 It should be
noted that it is not asserted that the company furnishing the racing news service is engaged in anything that is illegal per se.
Clearly there is nothing illegal in sending racing information over
wires, radio, or by the press. Insofar as the news service is used
by newspapers the printing therein of the news is presumably
protected by the First Amendment. There is more to the events
than meets the eye in any such simplistic account, however, although there are court rulings that support that position.
With the exception of the above cited Brophy v. California and
Pennsylvania Publicationsv. PUC, all such rulings antedate 1939.
In that year a federal-state drive to eliminate the Nationwide News
Service culminated in indictments in Chicago. The indictments
charged violations of the federal lottery laws, and on the basis of
the indictments the Illinois Bell Telephone Company and American
Telephone and Telegraph Company were notified by the United
States District Attorney and the States Attorney in Chicago of the
illegal use of the service. The companies were asked to discontinue
the service. There was some preliminary legal skirmishing but on
November 14 counsel for Annenberg's Nationwide News Service
and a quarter dollars from such business which was mainly used to service

places making books on races. One such service was the sixth largest

customer of Bell. The same data is repeated in Investigation of the Telephone

Industry, H. R. Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. fnt. p. 357 (1939). See
also Richard J. Beamish, Responsibility of Utilities for Criminal Use of
Service, 25 P. U. Fort. 586 (1940). An appendix to this piece is a letter of

Mr. William H. Lamb, general counsel of the Bell Telephone Company. He
comments on Commissioner Beamish's conclusions about the duty of the
utility. Mr. Beamish was active in the above cited proceeding.
37. The account rests on the following proceedings: Hagerty v. Coleman, 133 Fla. 363, 182 So. 776 (1938) ; Hamilton v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
34 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ohio 1940); Howard Sports Daily Inc. v. Weller,
36 P. U. R. (n.s.) 62 (1940), 179 Md. 355, 18 A. 2d 210 (1941) ; Partnoy 'V.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 70 P. U. R. (n.s.) 134 (1947); McBride v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 171 F. 2d 1 (9th Cir. 1948).
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announced that the service was being discontinued.8 There resulted a series of cases in various parts of the country in which
the communications company was requested by either or both the
United States Attorney and/or the State Attorney General to discontinue service to the racing news companies. Uniformly the
companies indicated their willingness to comply with the request
and their customers sought injunctions to restrain the cessation
of service. In every instance except the California and the Pennsylvania cases, the courts refused to utilize equity to preserve the
racing news business. 39
A series of related questions have been clarified in the process
of deciding the. particular proceedings. In nearly all of these cases
the Governor or the Attorney General has requested the company
to discontinue the service to the news service. Occasionally other
state officials have participated in the request, for example in the
McBride Case the sheriff of Kern County also requested the action
by the communications company. The local states' attorney has
also on many occasions joined or made the request. It may be said
that generally the courts have been willing to accept such requests
as valid ground for the discontinuance of the service. The single
exception is the Brophy Case,40 wherein the court surveyed the lav
on the subject and concluded that the Attorney General had no
power to order the telephone company to discontinue the service of
disseminating the racing information since the Railroad Commission had exclusive authority to control the utilities. It should be
noted that in the McBride Case, the request of the Attorney General and the Sheriff of Kern County was honored by the Company
and the action upheld in the federal courts. The court pointed out
that the telegraph company was operating under a Federal Com38. Telephony, Nov. 11, 1939, p. 26; Id., Nov. 18, 1939, p. 22.
39. Hamilton v. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ohio
1940) (Hamilton was regarded as the successor to- Nationwide) ; Fogarty
v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 34 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. La. 1940) (Fogarty was
regarded as connected with Nationwide) ; Tracy v. Southern Bell Tel. Co.,
37 F. Supp. 829 (S.D. Fla. 1940) ; Hagerty v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 145
Fla. 51, 199 So. 570 (1940). Hagerty also sought in a later suit to enjoin
discontinuance of service and was unsuccessful; the federal court also utilized
the WPB order issued in 1944. Hagerty v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 59 F.
Supp. 107 (S.D. Fla. 1945); Howard Sports Daily v. Weller, 36 P. U. R.
(n.s.) 62, 179 Md. 355, 18 A. 2d 210 (1941) ; Partnoy v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 70 P. U. R. (n.s.) 134 (1947). This opinion furnishes an excellent
description of the workings of the system in Kansas City. See also Re
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 79 P. U. R. (n.s.) 61 (1949) for a description
of the operations of the Pioneer News Service in St. Louis. McBride v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 171 F. 2d 1 (9th Cir. 1948). See also Kronenberg
v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 36 P. U. R. (n.s.) 513 (1940).
40. People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 120 P. 2d 946 (1942).
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munications Commission tariff which provided that its facilities
should not be used directly or indirectly in violation of any federal
or state law. The company, moreover, reserved the right to discontinue service when notified by federal or state officers that the
law is being violated. In this instance McBride collected information from eastern race tracks and sold it to Consolidated Publishing Company of Los Angeles. The latter in turn sent the news to
drops in various places in California. The court denied the request
for the injunction saying in part, ". . . It is not necessary that there
be a guilty participating of the sender or intermediate transmitter
of the messages to the drop. The guilty use of the drop in receiving
the messages is enough to show an illegal use of the wire's serv-

ice ....,,41

The constitutional issues that might be raised have been settled
in favor of the legality of the orders stopping the service. A rather
extensive claim was made in the Partnoy Case and was rejected
by the Missouri Commission. A more detailed examination of these
issues has been made in Maryland, but the result was the same. In
this instance the Western Union had discontinued an interstate
circuit to the Howard Sports Daily on the basis of a communication from the United States Attorney in Chicago. Howard then
gained its out of state racing news via telephone and in the present
proceeding sought to compel Western Union to furnish an intrastate circuit so that Howard's customers within the state might
be reached. "... The reports sent by appellant included entries in

races, the positions of the horses at various stages of the races, the
final results, and the prizes paid the winning horses ....

On five

of the premises [to which the appellant desired the wire service]
gambling was seen by witnesses. .. "
The commission had refused to order the company to furnish
the service and the courts in refusing to overrule the order held:
(1) there was no denial of due process and equal protection. "...
To force a public utility, under the guise of impartial regulation, to
furnish service and facilities for unlawful purposes would be contrary to public policy. . .

."

(2) There was no denial of freedom of

the press since that was construed to mean prior prohibition of
publication.

"...

It is obvious that the appellant has not been

denied the privilege of expressing its opinion on any subject. It is
an ancient doctrine of common law that no court should lend its
41. McBride v. Western Union Tel. Co., 171 F. 2d 1 (9th Cir. 1948).
The court assumed that McBride's business was legitimate. Bookmaking
was illegal in California.
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aid to enforce a contract to do an act that is illegal, or which is
inconsistent with sound morals or public policy, or which tends to
corrupt or contaminate by improper influences the integrity of
our social or political institutions ... .
The sweeping victory for the public officials who seek to prevent communication facilities to such services is marred by the defeat in Pennsylvania. Notice was made above to the ambiguous
situation in Pennsylvania, and that may have been an overstatement. In Pennsylvania Publicationsv. PUC, the supreme court of
Pennsylvania refused to uphold lower rulings which had denied
telephone service to the Publications company. The latter distributed a racing news sheet in which horses were given numbers.
The sheet was sold at news stands. In the sheet the publisher announced that he would answer telephone calls on the horses listed
therein. The telephone numbers were printed in the sheet and
calls were answered on races by quoting the horse's numbers as
given in the sheet in the order in which the said horses finished in
the race. The result was that the answer was useless without the
sheet.
It was a matter of record in the present proceedings that the
sheet had been found by the police in every bookie establishment
that had been raided for the preceding ten years. The court asserted that the publishing business was legal and that the telephone
company was not justified in refusing service to legitimate enterprises merely because the subscribers to the telephone service might
furnish information to others who would use it for some illegal
activity. Nonetheless the court, contrary to all others which have
found such service of use primarily to bookmakers, ruled that the
service should be continued and rested its views on the lines of
43
reasoning that in general prevailed prior to 1939.
One final aspect of the matter needs recounting. The aid of the
national government has been in' the attorneys joining with state
officers in requesting the communications' companies to discontinue service. Some states have wanted the Federal Communications Commission to enter the picture with a positive function of
aiding the state officials. At the 1948 meeting of the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners the representatives of California asked the adoption by the association of a reso42. Howard Sports Daily Inc. v. Weller, 179 Md. 355, 18 A. 2d 210
(1941).
43. Penn. Publications Inc. v. PUC, 349 Pa. 184, 36 A. 2d 777 (1944)
(for early stages see footnote 8 supra).
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lution requesting the Federal Communications Commission to institute an investigation into the use of interstate and foreign communications facilities ". . . to violate or to aid or abet, directly or
indirectly, the violation of any state law relating to bookmaking
and gambling. . . ." The Executive Committee recommended that
the resolution not pass and the association so voted.44 The Federal
Communications Commission early in 1949 rejected a similar plea
from the California commission. 5 In its Annual Report for that
year the Federal Commission commented on the request and justified its refusal to investigate. The Commission pointed out that
Western Union had on file tariff regulations which enabled state
officers to bring about discontinuance of service as has been indicated above. The Commission further stated that the Bell System
had no specific regulations on the subject but ". . . it was understood that, as a matter of policy, the companies had instructed their
personnel not to furnish interstate and foreign communication
service to persons using the same for unlawful purposes.. . ." The
Communication Commission added that it had requested the Bell
System to file regulations to that effect and that such regulations
had been filed during the course of that year.4 6 The Communications Commission thus absolved itself of any responsibility and
relegated the matter to the states and local authorities for action.
IV.

CONCLUSION

At present the situation is that the communication utility has
no obligation to serve local bookmakers. The same utility has no
obligation to serve for the distribution of information which will
be useful for illegal purposes. At the same time it is not illegal to
disseminate information about gambling odds and related data. The
bookmaker could operate on the information available in newspapers, but from the evidence presented in the Hearings his scale
of operations would be small. The communications service is important, if not indispensable, for large scale operations, and the
importance is in both areas of activity: local and interstate bookmaking and the speedy informational service on the races themselves.
No law enforcement officer expects to abolish bookmaking.
44. Proceedings, p. 170. See also pages 224-230. It was suggested in
the discussion that the matter was political in character.
45. P. U. Fort., 163 (1949). To some degree the state is interested because of parimutuel betting at tracks from which it derives revenue.
46. 15 FCC Ann. Rep. 99-100 (1949).
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They do hope to reduce its order of magnitude. The technique for
such reduction is to reduce the availability of telephone and telegraph service to local bookmakers and to prohibit the transmission of racing information which is to be used for gambling purposes. In the first activity there is competent authority in local
governmental agencies. The distribution of gambling information
is an interstate activity and needs congressional sanction. It is quite
clear that no national agency is going to interfere with state activity
designed to reduce the availability of such information. The state
agencies want assistance from the Federal Communications Commission however. The Interstate Commerce Committee of the
Senate has recommended that such assistance be made available.
The recommended legislation is the previously mentioned Sen.
3358. The bill proposes to make it illegal to transmit interstate
racing information for gambling purposes. At the same time it
seeks to allow news agencies to continue their usual activities. In
general the theme is to reduce data primarily useful to bookmakers
prior to the beginning of the contest. The measure thus moves into
the area of freedom of the press and speech. The distinction between
the types of information is not a simple one either. Neither the FCC
nor the utility companies anticipate the new duties with pleasure.
The issue in terms of social pressures is between some groups seeking to reduce conduct regarded as immoral and other groups, who
may regard the gambling as immoral, but who desire to escape the
responsibilities connected therewith. The outcome of the struggle
in Congress is by no means clear.

